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Abstract
This article deals with the position of  penghulu and modin and examines 
how they struggle for influence in the context of  marriage registration. Materials 
of  this article result from my ethnography in a village in East Java in 2017. 
I did interviews, participant observation and document analysis and applied 
the “state-in-society” approach to analyse the finding. In this article, I suggest 
that to maintain their influence, penghulu tend not to present themselves 
as ulama although their identity as a religious authority is highly important. 
Instead, penghulu identify themselves as the state agency by materialising their 
authority to provide state recognition of  Muslim marriages into the resource 
of  power. On the other hand, modin play important roles in bridging the 
relationship between the state and society. Modin find themselves subject to 
compromise between competing legal orders so that they sometimes need to 
produce an alternative legal norm to make their intermediary role possible. 
[Artikel ini mendiskusikan posisi penghulu dan modin serta melihat 
bagaimana mereka berjuang untuk berebut pengaruh di masyarakat dalam 
hal pencatatan perkawinan. Bahan-bahan artikel ini diperoleh dari etnografi 
yang saya lakukan di sebuah desa di Jawa Timur pada tahun 2017. Saya 
melakukan wawancara, observasi partisipatif, dan analisis dokumen serta 
menggunakan pendekatan “state-in-society” untuk menganalisa temuan 
lapangan. Saya menyimpulkan bahwa untuk mempertahankan pengaruhnya, 
penghulu cenderung tidak menampilkan dirinya sebagai ulama meskipun 
identitas mereka sebagai otoritas agama tetap penting. Sebaliknya, mereka 
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mengidentifikasi diri mereka sebagai agen negara dengan mentransformasi 
otoritas untuk memberikan pengakuan negara atas perkawinan sebagai 
sumber kekuasaan. Selain itu, modin memiliki peran penting dalam 
menjembatani hubungan negara dan masyarakat. Modin berada dalam situasi 
kompetisi antar norma hukum sehingga terkadang perlu untuk membuat 
norma hukum alternatif  untuk mempertahankan posisi mereka.
Keywords: penghulu, modin, nikah bedolan, nikah kantor
A. Introduction
“Ancaman saya begini: Saya turun jabatan atau buku nikahnya saya coret. 
Saya tidak mau instansi pemerintah dilecehkan.”
(My warning is like this: I step down or I cross out the marriage certificate. 
I do not want a government institution humiliated.) 
Pak Yusuf, the head of  a KUA office in Pasuruan
It was at the end of  January 2017. I suddenly stopped my 
motorcycle when I passed the Sumbersari’s grand mosque in Pasuruan. 
I looked to a green building next to the mosque. The building looked 
dirty, the front garden was untidy, but the entrance gates were left open. 
A small signboard reading ‘Kantor Urusan Agama’ was still hung on the 
fence. Leaves of  a mango tree at the corner of  the garden covered some 
parts of  the signboard. I was hesitant. I then came up to a young man 
sitting in a warung (food stall) right across the mosque. I asked him if  
that building was the office of  religious affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, 
henceforth referred to as the KUA)1 that I intended. The young man 
did not rebut my assumption, but explained that since months ago the 
building has no longer been used. It instead has moved few hundreds 
of  metres to the south, occupying a building that belongs to the local 
branch of  a traditionalist Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
On the following day, I visited the ‘new’ office and met with its 
highest official, Pak Yusuf2, the kepala (head) of  the KUA who at the 
1 It is important to remind that the KUA is a state body at the sub-district 
(kecamatan) level that is responsible for the administration of  Muslim marriage.
2 All the names of  the people here are not real.
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same time serves as the Pegawai Pencatat Nikah (PPN, the official of  
marriage registration). His position is socially acknowledged as penghulu 
or naib. Shortly, Pak Yusuf  explained that they had to move because 
major parts of  the old building do need renovation. According to him, 
the provincial office of  religious affairs has approved the proposal for 
reconstruction. However, the project cannot be commenced because 
there is still a problem with the legal status of  the land. Pak Yusuf  was 
nevertheless less knowledgeable about the historical past of  the land as 
he started to head that KUA since October 2014. He himself  resides 
in an area close to Surabaya, the capital city of  East Java province, that 
takes one hour by motorcycle to get the office. In the days where the 
number of  marriage ceremony3 escalates, he has to overstay in the office 
to be able to attend marriage ceremonies held in the early morning next 
day. During my fieldwork, he often welcomed me to stay in the office 
too. I had the pleasure to receive his offer as it allowed me to not only 
obtain deeper information surrounding marriage registration from him, 
but to have extensive chats with Pak Rohmat, one of  the local officers 
whose house is just a few dozen meters from the office. Pak Rohmat is 
a non-tenured employee (pegawai honorer) who has been affiliated with 
the KUA for more than 20 years. 
Pak Rohmat explained that since it first operated in 1961, the 
office has rented the house next to the mosque. In the early 1990s, the 
government actually allocated a land near the sub-district health centre to 
build a new KUA office. Some local religious elites who knew about this 
plan reacted with harsh resistance. They argued that the KUA, which deals 
with Islamic affairs, was ideally located side by side with a mosque. The 
government finally annulled its project. Later on, with the intervention of  
religious leaders, the owner of  the (rented) house was willing to exchange 
his property with the allocated land. Since then, the house has been in 
the government’s possession. Nevertheless, the exchange was undergone 
unofficially. As a local villager, Pak Rohmat is assigned to cooperate with 
village authorities to finalise its legal status. He does not mind doing this 
task, arguing “because my living comes from here.” 
3 To avoid misunderstanding, herein marriage ceremony refers to akad nikah 
or ijab kabul, the stage where the woman’s guardian in marriage offers the bride to the 
groom who then declares an acceptance.
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From this narrative, we may get an impression of  how informal, 
religious leaders exercised their power in the (re)making of  the state 
institution.4 The resistance against the construction of  a new building 
is one of  examples that a state institution cannot really be isolated from 
its social context. In this sense, Davis argues that “informality is both a 
mirror and a determinant of  the state’s formal reach”.5 Moreover, it is 
someway clear that the KUA has been expectedly perceived not limitedly 
as a formal institution working on the administration of  marriage. 
Rather, the KUA officers, let alone penghulu, KUA’s functionaries dealing 
specifically with marriage, have been assumed to hold religious authority. 
This perception is based on the reason that the penghulu have the task to 
solemnise a marriage ceremony according to Islam or, at least, to validate 
whether a marriage ceremony has been in accord with Islamic rules and, 
therefore, is qualified for registration.
With the “state-in-society” approach, this article concerns the fact 
that the state agency like KUA is unlikely detached from social forces it 
engages.6 Klinken and Barker have emphasised “the study of  the state 
in relation to the broader social context in which it is embedded”.7 
Considering this, I would like to draw our attention to a wider debate 
about state in society. This article focuses on the ways penghulu negotiate 
their authority in a society where the influence of  informal religious 
authorities is dominant. This article elucidates how the KUA and its 
officials at the subdistrict level shape and implement rules on marriage 
registration and analyses how they interact with different actors in the 
society.
On the basis of  everyday practice of  the KUA in my research field, 
I suggest that the KUA officers have the demands to negotiate its norms 
4 Adam White, “Introduction: A State-in-Society Agenda”, in The Everyday 
Life of  the State: A State-In-Society Approach, ed. by Adam White (Seattle: University of  
Washington Press, 2013), pp. 1–12.
5 D.E. Davis, “Informality and State Theory: Some Concluding Remarks”, 
Current Sociology, vol. 65, no. 2 (2017), p. 317.
6 Christian Lund, “Rule and Rupture: State Formation through the Production 
of  Property and Citizenship”, Development and Change, vol. 47, no. 6 (2016), p. 1200.
7 Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, “Introduction: State in Society in 
Indonesia”, in State of  Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia, ed. by Gerry van Klinken 
and Joshua Barker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2009), p. 5.
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and authority with the variety of  contexts. The KUA officers found it 
important to enhance good relationship with religious leaders and local 
elites in order to maintain stability. The officers, like Pak Rohmat who is 
a local villager, apparently play important roles in bridging their relations. 
Moreover, on par with the principles of  “dual validity” of  marriage, 
between the legal obligation of  marriage registration and the religious 
nature of  marriage ceremony, the flexibility of  KUA officials of  interpret 
and implement the rules determines the success of  marriage registration. 
The uneasy relationship between religious and administrative 
aspects of  marriage leaves penghulu with a dilemma. This dilemma is 
actually not new if  we trace back to the history of  penghulu since the 
colonial era. It has been argued how state-promoted penghulu ware at 
the crossroad between the interests of  Muslim leaders and the colonial 
government.8 Penghulu were sadly stereotyped by religious elites with 
inadequate knowledge about Islam.9 In the contemporary realm, 
Nurlaelawati has remarked that KUA officials, including the penghulu, 
cooperate with ulama and tend to position themselves as ulama than as 
state officials. In terms of  divorce, she found that penghulu has played 
roles as an intermediary between ulama and religious courts. More 
interesting is that, as she suggested, in particular areas, the KUA officials 
have an ambivalent position towards the judicial divorce in a way that 
they proceeded marriage registration of  a married couple who claimed 
having been in divorce but failed to present a divorce certificate.10    
Despite these available scholarly works, this chapter asks this 
fundamental question: In what ways does penghulu maintain their 
authority? This resonates with other questions, such as: What language 
do they use to struggle for power in society? How do people deal with 
them? In what ways do modin play roles? What can we theoretically explain 
from the everyday interaction between people, modin and penghulu? By 
proposing these questions, this article seeks to scrutinise the (political) 
8 Muhamad Hisyam, Caught between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch 
Colonial Administration, 1882-1942 (Jakarta: INIS, 2001).
9 Ibid.
10 Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: the Kompilasi Hukum Islam 
and Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2010), p. 189.
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position of  penghulu, and the KUA officers at large, in society. It then 
elucidates how penghulu seek for influence in navigating the practice of  
marriage in accordance with the state laws.
This article includes six sections. Following this introduction, I 
briefly elaborate a foundational framework on which this article stands. 
The next section seeks to demonstrate the social context in which the state 
is supposed to exercise its legal authority. From this point, I am going to 
address the image of  the state to begin the core discussion of  this article. 
Here, I look at different attitudes that interact within the institution. Later 
on, I expand the discussion of  the image by an analysis about the recent 
trend of  marriage registration. The sixth section examines the interaction 
between penghulu and social forces in the making of  marriage practice.  
B. Marriage Registration and the State-in-Society Approach
Pak Yusuf ’s words that began this chapter necessarily indicates that 
the state’s legal authority over marriage is never sterile from challenges. 
Marriage has been, and is still, subject to competing authorities.11 To 
figure out the complicated position of  state officials like Pak Yusuf  in 
society and its relation with informal authorities,12 this chapter applies 
the conceptual framework of  ‘state-in-society’ that has been subject 
to debate in the last decades. Among others, Joel Migdal is one of  the 
leading scholars on the subject. His book published in 2001 “State in 
Society”13 has been fundamental in providing insightful viewpoints to 
deal with the inquiry of  the making and the remaking of  the state in the 
face of  social realities. State-in-society approach is at large developed as 
a response to the fact that our today’s modern world is shaped by the 
authority of  the state with the force of  its formal rules. However, how 
these rules in practice are determined by “those who are supposed to 
11 Elizabeth S. Scott, “Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of  Marriage”, 
Virginia Law Review, vol. 86, no. 8 (2000), p. 1903.
12 Recent study of  the state and society has considered informality an analytical 
point of  departure for theorizing governance, citizenship, and social order. Davis, 
“Informality and State Theory: Some Concluding Remarks”.
13 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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enforce them” and by “those who are supposed to obey them”.14 This 
situation inescapably gives rise to a wide range of  competing authorities 
and discourses. Given this, it seems unlikely to avoid the necessity to look 
at the compound relationship between state authority and everyday social 
actors, comprehending their multiple narratives and political activities as 
the mutual process of  constituting one another. The relationship between 
them is accordingly perceived as a dialectical process.  
This perspective leads to a new, yet distinctive definition of  state. It 
revisits one proposed by earlier scholars like Weber who conceptualised 
state on the basis of  its institutional nature as powerful organisation that 
allows it to be a resource to coercion.15 This old understanding of  the state 
materialises in Weber’s commonly mentioned definition that “a state is a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of  the legitimate 
use of  physical force within a given territory”.16 At the core of  this definition 
clearly lies the notion of  domination by the means of  physical force in the 
state’s territory. Migdal sought to perceive domination as neither centred 
nor single, exclusively occupied by a formal organisation. Instead, he 
comes up with the idea of  “society’s multiple arenas of  domination and 
opposition”.17 He further suggests that state is a power that “embodies 
an ongoing dynamic, a changing set of  aims” as the consequence of  
social forces engaged.18 
In the study of  Islamic law and society, this state-in-society 
approach necessarily brings me back to a number of  works which have 
suggested the so-called cultural shape of  state activity. One of  which is 
the seminal work by Rosen on the practices of  the qadi in the context 
of  Islamic law and Moroccan social and cultural life.19 On the basis of  
the local sharia court records (sijill) in the town of  Sefrou, Morocco, he 
14 White, “Introduction. A State-in-Society Agenda”, p. 3.
15 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, p. 111.
16 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in From Max Weber: essays in sociology, ed. 
by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.
17 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, p. 99.
18 Ibid., p. 112.
19 Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of  Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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found that the oaths and the use of  professional witness are not truly 
based on the exact reality, but a matter of  the qadi’s construction as the 
result of  a process of  negotiation. This all is to establish judicial facts 
that make it possible for the qadi to draw decisions. 
Migdal offers two-aspect definition of  the state. He states: “The 
state is a field of  power marked by the use and threat of  violence and 
shaped by (1) the image of  a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, 
which is a representation of  the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual 
practices of  its multiple parts.20 The first aspect, the state’s image, assumes 
the state as a dominant and autonomous entity that controls the direction 
of  the given society. This also relates to how the state has become an 
integral part of  everyday social relations to explain why it continues to 
exercise a certain form of  authority.21 The second aspect, the practice, 
connects with the ways the state’s image is reinforced or weakened by 
the state officials and societal agencies. Simply, it focuses on the variety 
of  practices that influence the sharp demarcation between the state and 
the society.22 In this respect, we can see how state authority is negotiated 
by different actors. 
By following this framework, I perceive Muslim marriage 
registration as a political activity that involves the interaction between the 
state agent and everyday societal agency. First, I look at the development 
of  registered marriage. I then examine the practices of  penghulu and its 
KUA in addition to the image it portrays. For the image, I analyse internal 
dynamics within the KUA to understand the ways penghulu maintains 
the position of  the KUA. For the practice, my attention will focus on 
the recent trend in the practices of  marriage ceremony and marriage 
registration that have provided the ground where different authorities 
continue to contest.
C. Building an Internal Synergy, Maintaining the Power  
In this section, I wish to explain how the KUA looks like so as 
20 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, pp. 15–6.
21 White, “Introduction. A State-in-Society Agenda”, p. 13.
22 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another, p. 20.
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to reveal how people perceive it. For this end, this section analyses the 
attitudes and the interaction between functionaries in the KUA’s everyday 
life. Positions in the KUA can be simply divided into three categories, 
namely the head (kepala), marriage officials (penghulu), and administration 
officers. In KUA Sumbersari, these positions are run by four persons: 
two are civil servant, while the other two is non-tenured local officers. 
The office itself  occupies a two-floor building. The ground floor involves 
a main-long room and four small rooms. The main room includes two 
desks, in the front and in the back, separated by an old sofa-set in the 
middle.
The first civil servant is Pak Zaki. He occupies the front desk 
that functions as a registration counter. Pak Zaki was as a teacher in a 
state Islamic school in the town Bangil. In 2014, he decided to leave the 
school to become an officer of  the KUA. “I want to be more relax with 
this new position”, Pak Zaki said. Pak Zaki is responsible for managing 
the buku register (registration book). This book contains personal details 
of  the brides and the grooms, date of  registration, the proposed date 
of  marriage ceremony, the bride’s guardian, and the place of  marriage 
ceremony. He might be true that his new occupation is less hectic than 
the previous job. However, in regards to marriage administration process, 
Pak Zaki’s desk is at the heart of  all the procedures. Practically he is the 
one who verifies the accuracy of  the data (name, age, and the guardian 
of  the brides). 
In addition to Pak Zaki is Pak Yusuf  who occupies the back desk. 
Pak Yusuf  started his career as a civil servant under the office of  religious 
affairs of  Pasuruan in 1985. Since then he has always been working as 
an officer in KUA offices, moving from one office to another across 
the region. He was not trained in Islamic university nor graduated from 
pesantren. Rather, he went to vocational high school (Sekolah Menengah 
Kejuruan) in the 1970s and later on pursued a bachelor degree in economics 
with the degree of  Sarjana Ekonomi (SE). With the possession of  the 
bachelor degree, he was qualified to be promoted as a structural official 
(pejabat struktural), i.e. the kepala of  KUA. In the past, it was possible that 
an administration officer got promoted as the kepala as long as has met 
the required conditions. Pak Yusuf  made it in the end of  2004. At this 
position, Pak Yusuf  also serves as a marriage registrar (PPN, Pegawai 
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Pencatat Nikah). 
In the past, Kepala of  KUA was not always a penghulu although 
penghulu could, at the same time, have a structural position (jabatan 
struktural) as the kepala of  KUA. In Pak Yusuf ’s case, he is the kepala 
but is not a penghulu. Nevertheless, because the office does not have its 
own penghulu, he automatically undergoes the function as penghulu. This 
kind of  situation sometimes leads to problems if  he is not well skilled 
with religious competencies as expected by the society. Regardless, the 
government has changed the regulation concerning the kepala of  KUA. 
Currently, the kepala of  KUA must be a penghulu. 
The fact that Pak Yusuf  has to act as penghulu became a crucial 
issue in Sumbersari. Local people problematised his educational 
background as he never went to an Islamic school. Pak Yusuf  is not 
adequately trained in Arabic. It is worth to note that particular societies, 
like in Sumbersari, strictly demand activities in marriage ceremony, 
including the marriage sermon (khutbah nikah), the offer (ijab), and the 
acceptance (kabul), done in Arabic. They believe that the use of  Arabic 
makes the marriage ceremony more blessed. This definitely requires 
penghulu’s good skill of  recitation of  Quranic texts or proficiency (fasih) 
in reciting prayers in Arabic.
Some wooden-framed posters are hung on the wall nearby Pak 
Zaki. At the top, a big poster pertains to the regulation concerning the 
mechanism of  marriage registration fee which stresses the difference 
between nikah di KUA (marriage in the KUA) and nikah di luar KUA 
(marriage outside the KUA). Beneath it, a poster contains a hadith on 
marriage guardian and witnesses in marriage contract. The hadith says lā 
nikāḥa illā biwaliyyin wa shāhiday ‘adlin (no marriage except with a guardian 
and two non-discredited witnesses). It also contains a description of  the 
order of  the guardian which only comes from paternal side. If  the bride’s 
father is absent, there are twenty guardians that can orderly replace him, 
ranging from grandfather to oldest son of  great paternal uncle. 
A couple of  meters from Pak Zaki is a room where two non-
tenured officers execute their work. Their position is commonly called 
sukwan, which comes from the word sukarelawan (voluntary). They 
are local natives, Pak Rohmat and Pak Hamid. First, Pak Rohmat, as 
abovementioned, has the main task of  organising marriage documents. As 
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his house is close by the office, he is also assigned to handle the operation 
of  the KUA. Every morning, before the office hours, he opens the door 
and cleans the floor. In the evening, he comes back to the office to make 
sure that everything is safe. Pak Rohmat is also responsible for recording 
the personal details of  the marital couples in the buku bantu register (back-
up registration book). The difference of  this book from buku register 
that is kept by Pak Zaki lies in the column that mentions the number of  
marriage book (buku nikah) or the copy of  marriage certificate (kutipan 
akta nikah) that is to be given to the married couples. Pak Rohmat also 
takes charge of  writing their details in the buku nikah. Each couple receives 
a buku nikah. One with green-cover is for the wife (buku nikah istri), while 
the red-brick cover is for the husband (buku nikah suami). Second, Pak 
Hamid works on managing electronic data. Since 2013, the data of  the 
married couples have been managed electronically. The system is called 
SIMKAH (Sistem Informasi Manajemen Nikah). 
Pak Rohmat and Pak Hamid are from families of  religiously-
respected circles who have played considerable roles in the development 
of  the institution. In 1992, after finishing his secondary high school, Pak 
Rohmat replaced the position of  his big brother who just got promoted 
as a civil servant. Currently, his brother is serving as a penghulu in another 
sub-district. When taking over his brother’s position, Pak Rohmat had the 
same wishes, to be a civil servant too. Therefore, some years ago he took 
a bachelor degree in Islamic education that he meant to accelerate the 
promotion. However, up to now, he remains not promoted. Meanwhile, 
Pak Hamid is a local villager who is a graduate of  a prominent pesantren 
in the town which does not adopt secular education. Local people regard 
him more as an Islamic teacher (ustadz). He leads an informal Islamic 
school (madrasah diniyah) in a pesantren that belongs to his uncle who is 
of  the top leaders of  the local branch of  NU. Due to this activity, he 
does not work full day in the KUA. Moreover, it is his uncle that has the 
authority to permit the use of  the building for the temporary operation 
of  the KUA. In addition, his father was reported as one who made the 
land barter transaction in the past possible. 
From their everyday performance, we can easily identify the 
difference between the civil servants and the non-tenure officers. Their 
performance necessarily demonstrates the formal and the semi-formal 
408 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2019 M/1440 H
Muhammad Latif  Fauzi
position of  them. Pak Zaki and Pak Yusuf  wear a more formal dress, 
white long-sleeve shirt on certain days, with an official pin attached on 
their left chest. In addition, Pak Yusuf  always wears Islamic-typical cap 
(kopyah) covering his head. It seems that the kopyah says something about 
his state-sanctioned authority on Islamic matters. At the contrary, Pak 
Rohmat and Pak Hamid dress more informally. 
Although Pak Rohmat and Pak Hamid are non-permanent workers, 
their position is definitely of  high significance. First, as already mentioned, 
their family is genealogically linked with religious elites. Second, as the 
locals, they are emotionally close to modin. Modin is an informal marriage 
functionary, was seemingly formal, at the village level whose authority 
derives from the appointment made by the village headman (kepala desa). 
The majority of  them is graduates of  pesantren education. As part of  
tradition, marriage ceremony, particularly the couple’s first marriage, in 
the area always falls under the care of  modin. At its position, modin not 
only organise administrative papers for registration, but also arrange the 
whole process of  marriage ceremony. Third, Pak Yusuf  tends to assign 
one of  the local officers to represent him, once he cannot make it, in 
monthly informal meetings that involve modin and village officials. 
Meanwhile, taking care of  the registration desk, the civil servant 
Pak Zaki feels bound with the state regulation. Pak Zaki argues that he 
just implements the procedure as is written. Quite often he receives 
complains from modin that he is considered terlalu ketat (too rigorous) and 
mempersulit (complicating). This usually happens when Pak Zaki demands 
the couples to come for rafak (document verification), but the modin 
is hesitant to make it for several reasons. One of  which could be that 
one of  the couples still stays in pesantren or work out of  the town. The 
case can also be that the couples did not yet sign the marriage consent 
form. In this situation, modin usually comes to Pak Rohmat to discuss 
the situation with an expectation that he helps to convince Pak Zaki that 
everything will go fine. Pak Zaki’s concern is “If  an official from the district 
office of  religious affairs performs an audit and he finds something odd; it is none 
of  your (modin’s) responsibility. Instead, we get blamed.” Therefore, in certain 
occasions the PPN, Pak Yusuf, has to intervene the tension, stating. “Up 
to you, modin. If  you do not follow our rules, please do not work with us!” 
From the above explanation, we see the entanglement of  issues, 
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ranging from social forces behind the local officers and the manoeuvres 
of  modin, that shades everyday practice of  the KUA. Pak Yusuf  is aware 
of  this situation that he needs to manage his authority, exercising the 
power of  domination, very carefully. As the PPN, he is a representative 
of  the state, but as a penghulu, he is assumed to represent religion. Pak 
Yusuf  let the local officers play roles in bridging the communication 
between the KUA and the local people. Meanwhile, Pak Zaki tends to 
place himself  as the guardian of  the state rules. These attitudes altogether 
have been important for co-shaping the everyday image of  the KUA as 
an institution dealing with Islamic affairs on the one hand and as a state 
body in charge of  marital administration on the other.
D. Registering Marriages and Remarriages
As far as marriage practice throughout East Javanese villages are 
concerned, when the date of  marriage ceremony is agreed on by the two 
families concerned, the girl’s father comes to a modin. He asks modin’s help 
to arrange the marriage ceremony. Disclaimer, however, should be made. 
People always go to modin in the case of  first marriage where either the 
bride or the groom, or both of  them, is unmarried before. If  it is not 
a first marriage for one of  the couples, there is no guarantee that modin 
is used. The father-modin interaction marks the initial process of  the 
implementation of  the state laws on marriage. In Sumbersari setting, I 
observed a conversation between a father and a modin as the following:
Father : Pak Haji, I am going to marry my daughter. How much to 
buy (get) a marriage certificate?
Modin : Praise be to Allah, your daughter has found her future 
husband. Wish her a blessed relationship in this world and 
in the hereafter. Marriage certificate is not buying, but has to 
do with marriage registration that requires some conditions. 
First, marriageable ages: for women 16 years, and for men 19 
years. Second, you have to hand in a family card, an identity 
card, and a school diploma.
Father : Yes, they all are ready.
Modin : Are you going to handle the registration yourself  or ask me 
to make it?
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Father : I want you handle it, Pak Modin, including the marriage 
ceremony.
Modin : If  you wish so, the cost is this (certain amount), covering the 
organising of  all the documents, transport cost, and marriage 
ceremony.
The above conversation clearly shows that the villagers generally 
perceive marriage registration as “buying a marriage certificate”. They 
argue because they need to spend a certain amount of  money to attain it. 
The modin usually tell them that it is not buying a letter, but registering a 
marriage. Not only in marriage registration, this kind of  perception also 
applies to judicial divorce. The locals use the phrase of  melleh talak ka 
hakim (buying divorce from religious judges). Some people name it with 
melleh kartu koning (buying a yellow card) because the divorce certificate 
for a wife has yellow ornaments on it. 
Despite the local perception of  marriage registration as buying a 
marriage certificate, if  we look at the figures of  registered marriage, it 
appears that marriage registration has increasingly become an important 
part of  local marriage practice. I talked with many of  modin and they 
generally confirmed that marriage registration has become people’s need. 
One of  them said: “It has changed now. Nearly all marriages are registered in 
the KUA.” With 61,650 Muslim population, Sumbersari sub-district has 
around 500-550 registered marriages a year. In the Pasuruan regency 
with Muslim population of  1,604,325 in 2015, the number of  marriages 
is around 14,150 a year. The highest number of  marriages in the most 
populated sub-district, Gempol, with 199,272 of  Muslim population is 
1,308 per year. The lowest number, amounting to 99 marriages a year, 
belongs to the Tosari sub-district, where Muslim population is 5,625.23 
My materials from the local KUA record show that there was an 
incredible increase in marriage in 2010 compared to previous years. In 
2008, registered marriage was around 485 and it elevated to 642 in 2010. 
I, unfortunately, did not have enough materials to explain this escalation. 
However, if  allowed to make speculations, on the basis of  information 
that I collected from modin, it was driven by different factors. First, the 
23 BPS Kab. Pasuruan, Kabupaten Pasuruan dalam Angka 2016 (Pasuruan: BPS 
Kab. Pasuruan, 2017), p. 232.
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ever-married couples tend to register their remarriage. Second, people 
are more aware that many incentives such as government subsidies or 
access to bank loan are more welcome with the possession of  marriage 
certificate. Third, both parents find it important to list their names on 
their child’s birth certificate. What follows is the figure of  registered 
marriage since the 1960s until today.
 Since 2015 there has been a tendency of  the decline in marriage 
registration. When I consulted this with the officers of  the KUA, they 
argued that the decline is neither caused by the decrease in marriage nor 
the rise of  unregistered marriage. Social mobility seems to be the major 
factor contributing to this change. Unlike in the past that marriages 
generally involved between local peoples, now young generations have an 
ample opportunity for establishing cross-cultural families. This indication 
can be seen from the introductory letter (surat pengantar) issued by the 
local KUA for a groom to register his marriage in the KUA with which 
the bride is affiliated.  
People’s attitude towards the importance of  marriage registration 
not only applies to first marriage, but also remarriage. The number of  
remarriages, where one of  the couples or both is janda (ever-married 
women) and duda (ever-married men), constitutes nearly one-fourth of  
the whole marriage.24 In the year 2015, there were 124 remarriages out of  
553 marriages or 22.42%. Meanwhile, in the year 2016, there were 122 
remarriages out of  532 marriages or 22.93%. This figure also suggests 
another aspect that there has been an increase in people’s awareness 
to seek for judicial divorce from religious court. Based on the records 
from Islamic court in 2015, the number of  divorce of  marriages that 
were registered in KUA Sumbersari was 104. 23 were divorces initiated 
by husbands (cerai talak) while the rest 81 were requested by wives (cerai 
gugat). Here, the ratio of  divorce is 18.9% compared to the number of  
marriages of  the same year. From this figure, I assume that both KUA 
and religious court have increasingly shaped people attitudes in coping 
with marital matters. This finding corroborates earlier studies that shed 
light on the blast of  divorce cases in Indonesian religious courts over 
24 The KUA administration and the civil registration in Indonesia differentiate 
between janda mati (widow) and janda cerai (divorced woman) as well as duda mati 
(widower) and duda cerai (divorced man).
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the last decade.25 .
E. Akad Dua Kali (twofold marriage ceremonies), modin and 
penghulu’s domination
People’s changing attitude towards marriage registration, as shown 
in the previous section, underscores optimism about the effective 
functioning of  the state as a body wielding legal authority. Does this mean 
that people are now more inclined to dispense their religious affairs to 
the state agent? If  so, to what extent does it affect the roles of  traditional 
leaders? With reference to the law no. 22/1946 on registration of  Muslim 
marriage, divorce, and reconciliation, article 6 of  the Compilation of  
Islamic Law states that a marriage ceremony must be concluded before 
and under the supervision of  a marriage registrar (PPN). However, back 
to the statement at the beginning of  this article, it is obvious that Pak 
Yusuf  sought to proclaim its state-bestowed power of  legalisation of  
Muslim marriage. He even played with threats to emphasise its authority. 
This situation leads me to an inquiry of  what has actually happened to 
state-society relationship behind marriage registration. 
Somewhere in May 2017, a family whose daughter would be 
going to wed held a walimah in a Pasuruan village. Walimah is a religious 
congregation that aims to make a marriage ceremony (akad nikah) publicly 
announced. It is usually held in the morning, inviting relatives, neighbours 
and respectable figures of  the village. The groom and a few of  his family 
members also attend. The programme starts with the recitation of  mawlid 
(prayers for the Prophet) and prayers, most of  the time ended with akad 
nikah ceremony. Two weeks before, when the bride’s father was visiting 
Haji Misbah, a modin of  the village, to arrange the marriage ceremony, 
he decided to register it as nikah kantor, marriage in the KUA office. Haji 
Misbah asked the father about who would serve as the munakkiḥ, stating 
the following:
“I told the father that the obligation of  marrying a woman returns to the 
wali. It is much better, if  the wali can make it himself. However, he can 
25 Euis Nurlaelawati, “Muslim Women in Indonesian Religious Courts: Reform, 
Strategies, and Pronouncement of  Divorce”, Islamic Law & Society. 2013, vol. 20, no. 3 
(2013), pp. 242–71; Mohamad Abdun Nasir, “Islamic Law and Paradox of  Domination 
and Resistance”, Asian Journal of  Social Science, vol. 44, nos. 1–2 (2016), pp. 78–103. 
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delegate it to another figure as he favours. It is though common that the 
wali gives it to the modin. However, the wali remains obliged to be present 
in the marriage ceremony.”
Shortly, the walimah was held on the same day as the akad nikah 
scheduled by the KUA. In the meantime, the father was persuaded by his 
family to include the akad nikah in the walimah as is commonly practised. 
It was said: “mumpung Gus Akib rawuh, dinikahno sekalian ae” (while Gus 
Akib is present, better to marry them now). Gus Akib is a prominent 
religious leader with whom the bride’s family consult about Islam and 
other matters. Living within the pesantren tradition, the locals still hold the 
belief  in the concept of  barakah (blessing), a quality which is reflected 
through people who perform good religious acts.26 They idealise a blessed 
marriage ceremony through the intermediary of  Gus Akib. The father 
thus brought up the situation to Haji Misbah, the modin, who was among 
the guests in the walimah. Haji Misbah had no objection, allowing the 
akad nikah to take place, but insisted him to conclude a successive akad 
nikah in the KUA a few hours afterwards. This practice led to so-called 
akad dua kali.
A religious leader like Gus Akib who was willing to marry them 
in a religious manner is probably exceptional. Gus Akib is a village-level 
religious leader. Some religious leaders with high reputation usually deny 
to marry the couples, unless the penghulu is present.27 They suggest the 
family to held the ceremony directly in the KUA because they do not 
invite the penghulu to come to home. These religious leaders understand 
the consequence of  marriage with no registration. They tend to support 
the authority of  the penghulu and the KUA and perceive both marriage 
ceremony and the registration as a one inseparable process. 
It goes without saying, this kind of  akad dua kali practice constituted 
the context why Pak Yusuf  expressed such a harsh statement. It was said 
26 In the Sufism doctrine, one can receive God’s blessing through the 
intermediary of  a holy man such as a saint or the murshid. Within the pesantren tradition, 
students are supposed to respect their teacher not only in the classroom but also in all 
aspects of  life. The failure to give respect may cause the loss of  barakah of  the teacher. 
See Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 
p. 215; Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role of  the Kyai in the Maintenance 
of  Traditional Islam in Java (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1999), pp. 61–2.
27 This is according to Pak Syukron, a modin in Sumbersari.
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in response to the phenomenon of  akad dua kali that has occurred during 
the last years. This practice emerges as a consequence of  the new policy 
drawn by the central government in 2014 that has set a stricter boundary 
between marriage in the office (nikah kantor) and marriage outside the 
office (publicly known as nikah bedolan).28 It is worth to note that the 
basic principle is that a marriage ceremony is held in the KUA office. 
This is according to article 21 point (1) of  the regulation of  Muslim 
marriage registration.29 Interestingly, point (2) regulates that considering 
the proposal of  the brides and with the PPN’s agreement, a marriage 
can be held outside the KUA office. Now, the difference between nikah 
in the KUA and outside the KUA becomes more obvious due to the 
application of  the multiple tariffs. Those who perform nikah kantor are 
charged Rp. 0. Meanwhile, the couples’ family have to pay more, Rp. 
600,000 (more or less 40 US dollars), if  they wish to conclude a marriage 
ceremony outside the office or out of  working hours. Before 2014, there 
was no difference between the two. 
The differentiation of  the tariffs in fact gives rise to the practice 
of  akad dua kali. In a simple way, akad dua kali is a marriage ceremony 
that is originally proposed to be nikah kantor, but in practice involves 
both nikah bedolan and nikah kantor. Nikah bedolan is done traditionally, 
without the attendance of  a penghulu, while nikah kantor is done in the 
KUA solely for the sake of  state recognition. They are most of  the time 
performed on the same day. The issue seems to revolve around money. 
However, in regards the aforementioned story, it has to do with more 
fundamental aspects such as the ideal of  marriage ceremony in the eyes 
of  local people. This section demonstrates how penghulu negotiates its 
authority within the pressure of  numerous forces: the state, local tradition, 
and his own interest.
By the new regulation, it appears that the state seeks to increase 
its intervention in marriage. Due to the alleged issue of  eradicating 
28 Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation) No. 48 Tahun 2014 tentang 
Perubahan atas Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 47 Tahun 2004 tentang Tarif  atas Jenis 
Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak yang Berlaku pada Departemen Agama (on the 
Revision of  the Government Regulation No. 47/2004 on the non-tax revenue of  the 
Department of  Religious Affairs).
29 Peraturan Menteri Agama (The regulation of  the Minister of  Religious 
Affairs) No. 11/2007 on Pencatatan Nikah (marriage registration).
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gratification amongst penghulu, the campaign of  nikah kantor has actually 
started some years before. Considering this development, the central 
government has done significant efforts to enhance the KUA office to be 
an ‘ideal house’ for marriage ceremony, called balai nikah (marriage house). 
In Sumbersari setting, the second floor of  the office is an open hall that 
functions as the balai nikah where marriage ceremonies are concluded. 
The existence of  balai nikah becomes increasingly important, irrespective 
of  the fact that the majority of  them still has less adequate facilities. For 
this reason, the central government has spent considerable amount of  
budget to renovate hundreds of  KUA building throughout Indonesia.30 
Certainly, the differentiation between nikah kantor and nikah bedolan 
was not issue in the past because there was no difference of  the tariffs. My 
observation in Sumbersari shows that about 95% of  marriage ceremonies 
prior to 2014 were undertaken outside the office. In 2017, the condition 
has absolutely change where the rate of  nikah bedolan was 24% of  531 
marriages. This pattern is not typical to Pasuruan villages, but also in 
everywhere. Let us have a look at the detailed figures in a KUA within 
the urban community in the town of  Jember, East Java.31 In 2013, the 
ratio of  nikah bedolan was 92% of  the whole marriage (730 of  799), and 
it declined significantly in the two years after. In 2014, nikah bedolan was 
598 of  792 (76%), while in 2015 was 439 of  746 (59%). It climbed a 
little bit in 2016 (64%) and in 2017 (76%), although the rise is still far 
below that of  2013. 
Similar to Jember, in Yogyakarta, the difference of  the tariffs does 
not influence much. The rate of  nikah bedolan remains high, approximately 
85%. A number of  factors underlines this situation. First, people in 
Yogyakarta generally perceive the state penghulu as a religious official 
with adequate knowledge of  Islam. So, they just submit all marriage 
matters to penghulu. In many cases, it is penghulu who leads the marriage 
ceremony and serves as munakkih. Second, the amount of  nikah bedolan 
is not significant for them. Third, they tend to held nikah bedolan because 
30 Kemenag, “Tiga Tahun Jokowi-JK: Kemenag Pemrakarsa Dan Investor 
Terbesar SBSN,” accessed May 7, 2018, https://kemenag.go.id/berita/read/505984/
tiga-tahun-jokowi-jk--kemenag-pemrakarsa-dan-investor-terbesar-sbsn.
31 This data is calculated from the SIMKAH record that I obtained from a 
colleague of  mine who is a penghulu in that KUA.
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they want to invite their relatives, neighbours and colleagues to witness 
the ceremony. Fourth, for social recognition, some families held the 
marriage ceremony in prestigious places, such as in hotels or halls. For 
this interest, no reason not to invite penghulu. However, a small number 
of  them choose to have nikah kantor. The reason is usually because they 
do not want complexities and avoid being busy.32 
The variety of  these practices, as I claimed before, without doubt 
has to do with the implementation of  multiple tariffs. Haji Misbah argued: 
“the problem is that the difference is very big, Rp. 600,000 for villagers is a significant 
amount.” Throughout the years 2004-2013, marriage administration costed 
Rp. 30,000. With the assistance of  modin, people in fact spent around 
Rp. 350,000; around one-third of  the amount for the KUA nonetheless. 
As shown in the above story, the brides’ families generally preferred the 
akad nikah held within walimah for at least two benefits: the participation 
of  villagers and the involvement of  honoured religious leader. Marriage 
ceremony has been a fundamental arena where religious leaders exercise 
their authority.
As is commonly found in Muslim community across the nation, 
marriage ceremony is both religious and social activities.33 Muslim scholars 
in general argue that Islamic marriage is an embodiment of  the elements 
of  civil contract, spiritual practice and worship of  the divine.34 It further 
means that Islamic marriage is not merely a matter that comes under 
the category of  mu‘amalah (civil contract), i.e. pronouncing a contract of  
ijab (offer) made by the woman’s guardian (wali), qabul (acceptance) by 
the man, and the payment of  dower (mahr). It is nevertheless a contract 
that has the dimension of  ‘ibadah (ritual acts) in which normative and 
traditional elements of  religion are engaged.35 Therefore, in social practice, 
32 This is summarized from my interview with Pak Nasrudin, a penghulu in 
Yogyakarta, August 2019.
33 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial: Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco 
(London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000).
34 Joel A. Nichols, “Religion, Family Law, and Competing Norms”, in Negotiating 
State and Non-State Law: The Challenge of  Global and Local Legal Pluralism, ed. by Michael 
A. Helfand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 197.
35 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Marriage”, Encyclopedia of  Islam and the Muslim World 
(New York: Macmillan, 2004).
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we see the interweaving of  marriage ceremony with religious rituals,36 such 
as the recitation of  verses of  the Quran, sholawat (prayers for blessings on 
the Prophet), and tahlil (prayers for the ancestors). I witnessed the similar 
rituals in Pasuruan villages. Even for certain communities there, particular 
days, like Friday Pon,37 are believed sacred for a marriage ceremony. 
I discussed this issue with a local religious leader, Kyai Karim. 
He argued that it is understandable that people tend to conclude a 
marriage ceremony at home. His concern revolved around the religious 
capacity of  penghulu because religious leaders in general assume penghulu 
to perform as ulama. In fact, Pak Yusuf  has never been trained in an 
Islamic institution. Kyai Karim criticised the government for taking it 
too easy in promoting its functionary to be a penghulu. Another aspect 
he stressed was that facilities in the KUA are not yet appropriate (pantas) 
for conducting a marriage ceremony. He argued both the bride and the 
groom must be “respected” (dimulyakan). On certain busy days, they have 
to queue like people taking raskin (beras miskin, rice for the poor). Kyai 
Karim further said:
“I heard public rumours that the penghulu is less competent. His skill of  
reciting ayat (Quranic verses) and doa (prayers) is someway annoying. 
People are certainly hesitant to involving him in marriage ceremony. 
Marriage is a sacred ceremony. It is an ibadah. Like sholat, if  you do not 
recite surah Al-Fatihah, the main element in sholat, in a proper way, your 
sholat is not accepted.”
This kind of  perspective has been a common understanding of  
the villagers through times. As such, they perceive akad nikah as a crucial 
stage in marriage practice that needs careful handling. There is a feeling 
of  firmed (yakin) about the religious validity (keabsahan) of  akad nikah 
if  it is guided by a prominent religious leader, in addition to the issue 
of  obtaining barokah. In nikah bedolan, people mostly ask their respected 
kyai to lead the marriage ceremony, while in nikah kantor, they tend to 
delegate the rights to marriage guardianship to modin, not penghulu. This 
situation also explains why modin still survive because their roles can 
meet religious-cum-administrative interests. Occasionally, parents bring 
36 Ann Black, Hossein Esmaeili, and Nadirsyah Hosen, Modern Perspectives on 
Islamic Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), p. 114.
37 Pon is one of  the five-day pasaran (marketplace) cycle in the Javanese calendar.
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their preferred munakkiḥ38 to the office. In a peculiar condition, it is said 
that there were families who had to perform a repetitioned akad nikah 
at home because they felt doubt about the validity of  the earlier akad 
nikah at office. In this sense, akad dua kali can be both ways, home then 
office and vice versa. 
The phenomenon of  akad dua kali demonstrates ambivalence of  
the state’s attempt to control marriage. For Pak Yusuf  who is at the basic 
frontier of  the Muslim marriage registration, this development is indeed 
a drawback. My informant, a high official at district office of  religious 
affairs, did not disregard that people in Pasuruan villages still perform 
great dependence (ketergantungan) on kyai that gives rise to the uneven 
relationship between state penghulu and religious leaders.39 Pak Yusuf  is 
aware that what has challenged him is the force of  informal religious 
authority. This situation leads him to speak on behalf  of  the state, rather 
than to perceive himself  as religious authority.  In so doing, he exploits 
the authority of  giving state recognition of  religious marriage as the 
means to negotiate. Here is his statement:
“I do not like that they are first married at home, and later conclude 
another marriage ceremony in the KUA. Usually I ask the witness whether 
or not they are already married. If  so, I say: If  you want a marriage 
certificate, just ask to your kyai!”
Not only the penghulu, Haji Misbah who serves as the intermediary 
between the state and people found a dilemma too. He apparently 
proposed the notion of  what he called ta’kidun nikah. I failed to find out 
the origin of  this concept. Literally speaking, the first word “ta’kid” is 
associated with the Arabic word tawkid, meaning endorsing or ratifying.40 
Ta’kidun nikah can be meant as authenticating a marriage (pengukuhan 
pernikahan). With this concept, Haji Misbah expects that akad nikah in 
the KUA just aims to provide a state authentication over the foregoing 
religious marriage. Interestingly, he also applied this concept in another 
38 Munakkiḥ is a person to whom the marriage guardian delegates his authority 
to marry his daughter.
39  Interview with Pak Usman, the head of  the section of  Islamic guidance of  
the Pasuruan office of  religious affairs, February 2017.
40  Elsaid M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, ‘د/ك/و w–k–d’, Arabic-
English Dictionary of  Qur’anic Usage, Leiden edition (Brill, 2008), p. 1044.
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context, that is underage marriage. If  the bride has not yet reached a 
marriageable age according the law, the couples are first married in a 
religious way. Later when the woman’s age is already legally qualified for 
marriage registration their marriage is registered to the KUA. 
Additionally, the issue of  akad dua kali came up in a series of  
meetings between the KUA and modin. Pak Yusuf  harshly cautioned the 
modin to prevent this marriage, saying “Don’t ever marry them at home!”. 
However, in addition to the issue of  competing authorities, there has 
been another aspect that becomes his, and other penghulu’s, concern. Note 
the following statement by Pak Yusuf: 
“They just want the free of  charge. I first glanced over them, whether 
they get here by motorcycle or by car. Sometimes I was hesitant to marry 
them in the office. Just imagine, they came here by Livina (a minibus) and 
the dower for the bride was 1 million. This did not make sense if  they 
have a nikah kantor. I could not accept. Invite us to come to their home! 
Make nikah bedolan, and pay 600,000 for the sake of  religious, worldly, 
and afterlife interests!”
From the above quote, Pak Yusuf  tended to make relation between 
nikah kantor and the financial capacity of  the families concerned. He 
thus questioned why it is hard for people to spend an extra money to 
make nikah bedolan whereas they will get a marriage certificate that, in 
his opinion, works for the worldly and religious aspects in marriage. He 
said “buku nikah sekali untuk seumur hidup” (a marriage certificate is once 
for the long life). Meanwhile, a penghulu of  the KUA in the town Jember 
once said to me “This year (2018), we target 85% for nikah bedolan.” 
From both statements, it appears to me that the issue of  nikah bedolan 
somehow resonates with an economical interest. Here is the logic. It is 
worth to mention that the application of  multiple tariffs was an outcome 
of  the absence of  regulation concerning the incentive for penghulu in nikah 
bedolan. The central government then set out the tariff  of  nikah bedolan, 
from which penghulu are legally entitled to additional incomes. Based on 
the regulation, from each nikah bedolan, a penghulu receives more or less 
Rp. 100,000 for the transportation and Rp. 150,000, or other amounts 
depending on the KUA category, for honorarium (jasa profesi).41 Within 
41  Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam (the Decree 
of  the Directorate General of  Islamic guidance) No. DJ.II/748 Tahun 2014 tentang 
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this sense, the fluctuating number of  nikah bedolan has become a major 
issue amongst penghulu as it influences their incentive. 
Pak Syamsu, a kepala of  KUA in the town of  Surabaya acknowledged 
that this bureaucratic reform has provided a legal certainty for the rights 
of  penghulu in nikah bedolan on the one hand.42 However, on the other 
hand, it does not overcome the problem of  the organisation of  marriage 
registration in general. He referred to the low capacity of  the KUA in 
running its everyday activity due to the limited budget allocated by the 
government. He argued: “The new regulation made us powerless. With 
the last regulation, we could still donate social or mosque activities around 
us. Now, the budget for KUA is very limited. We cannot do anything for 
our non-tenured staff  and society because we do not own the money 
anymore.” In the past, the KUA had an autonomy to manage the money 
received from people via modin that made it powerful institutionally. With 
Rp. 0 for nikah kantor and the incentive limited for penghulu from nikah 
bedolan, the kepala of  KUA is currently challenged with the problems 
related to the organisation of  the office. As response to this, I witnessed 
that some KUA encourage its penghulu not to take all the incentive, but to 
distribute some portion of  it for the larger interest of  the KUA.   
Apart from this, on the basis of  Migdal’s state-in-society, the 
practice of  akad dua kali has been a place where the state cannot assume 
its single-authoritative authority in marriage practice, and consequently, 
everyday agency intervenes in the making of  the state practice. The 
practice has turned to provide what Peletz has called “the co-imbrication 
of  law, politics, and religion”.43 Akad dua kali encompasses the multiplicity 
of  issues, ranging from state authority, religious authority, the local sense 
of  religious validity, and penghulu’s economic interest. On the one hand, 
there has been a local development that people strategize the multiple 
tariffs of  marriage by concluding akad dua kali. By doing so, they 
Petunjuk Teknis Pengelolaan Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak atas Biaya Nikah atau 
Rujuk di luar Kantor Urusan Agama Kecamatan (on the technical procedure of  the 
organisation of  non-tax revenue from the fees of  marriage or reconciliation outside 
the sub-district KUA). 
42  Interview with Pak Syamsu, October 2017.
43  Michael G. Peletz, “A Tale of  Two Courts: Judicial Transformation and the 
Rise of  a Corporate Islamic Governmentality in Malaysia”, American Ethnologist, vol. 
42, no. 1 (2015), pp. 144–60.
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manage to maintain the ideal of  marriage ceremony that incorporates 
religious and social activities, in addition to the perception of  the lack of  
penghulu’s religious competency. The interference of  traditional authority 
is embedded in this realm. On the other hand, this “deviation” has 
become a critical step stone for penghulu in the implementation of  state 
laws on marriage at grassroot level. Penghulu, however, does not pretend 
to directly oppose the traditional authority. Instead, he tends to perform 
as the state agent, exercising his authority by the means of  threat that 
state recognition of  marriage is never possible without the possession of  
a marriage certificate that he signs. In addition, for penghulu himself, there 
is another issue pertaining to the financial incentive from nikah bedolan.
F. Concluding Remarks
On the basis of  the development of  a KUA office in Pasuruan 
society, it seems obvious that everyday life of  the state body is not a 
compartmentalised and isolated aspect of  society. In this article, Migdal’s 
state-in-society approach has been helpful to reveal the complexities 
faced by penghulu and the KUA in the implementation of  legal rules on 
marriage registration  within a web of  pressures from societal agencies. 
I found out that the internal synergy between the KUA’s officers 
has been the key to secure the KUA’s legitimacy. First, the kepala of  the 
KUA and the penghulu need to understand local social life, including 
how the local people perceive marriage ceremony, and transform it into 
the ground of  decision. Second, non-tenured local officers also play a 
considerable role in communicating the state’s ideas on marriage with 
social agencies, including modin. Third, the KUA’s civil servants tend to 
guard the implementation of  the state rules. Furthermore, in Pasuruan 
villages, local people regard marriage registration as a state-citizen 
transactional relationship. Modin serve as the key agent of  brokerage. 
This KUA-modin-society relationship has produced the remarkable 
development of  registered marriages and remarriages. In other words, 
this triangle relationship signifies the effective functioning of  the state. 
Nevertheless, the central Indonesian government has its own ideas 
on how to manage marriage registration. The central government made 
a regulation that has drawn a stricter boundary between nikah kantor and 
nikah bedolan that it assumed effective to eradicate gratification amongst 
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penghulu. In practice, this regulation has intensified the tension between 
religious authority and the state agency and led to the practice of  akad 
dua kali. It seems that akad dua kali emerges as the implication of  the 
multiple tariffs of  marriage ceremony. However, it also has to do with 
how marriage ceremony is conceptualised locally. In everyday Muslim 
life, marriage ceremony entails not only religious but social activities 
that call for the intervention of  religious leaders. At the same time, we 
witness the situation where penghulu are still challenged with the lack of  
competency about Islam. In this situation, penghulu need to redefine their 
position to be a legitimate agent dealing with Muslim marriages. Penghulu 
transformed their authority to provide state recognition of  marriage into 
their source of  power.
To conclude, in Pasuruan context, penghulu tend not to identify 
themselves as ulama although the identity as a religious authority remains 
important. Instead, penghulu identify themselves as the state agent, 
materialising their authority to provide state recognition of  marriage into 
the resource of  coercion. This suggests two interrelated aspects: First, 
they always speaks on behalf  of  the state. Second, marriage certificate 
has been an important means to defend their authority. Finally, interesting 
to bear in mind that modin apparently play greater roles in bridging 
the relationship between the state and society. Modin find themselves 
subject to compromise between competing legal orders that gives rise 
to the production of  a new legal norm such as ta’kid al-nikah to make 
their intermediary role possible. Regardless, the fact that penghulu are not 
successful to persuade society to marry according to the State law in the 
first place suggests that they do not enjoy a solid position in society. On 
the other hand, with ta’kīd al-nikāḥ, modin has created a semi-autonomous 
social field, which sustains customs and rules symbols internally but is 
also vulnerable to rules and decisions from outside the field.  
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